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ARGUMENT
I.

The Entry Into The House Was Within The Scope Of The Consent
The district court found that Greco had consented to a police search of
her son's room. (R., p. 81.) Despite this undisputed factual finding the district
court concluded that the police entry into the house where Greco resided was
illegal.

(R., pp. 84-86.)

Consent, however, is an exception to the warrant

requirement and justifies entry into the home. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,
522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 695, 978 P.2d
881, 883 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387,
390 (Ct. App. 1998).

The scope of consent is determined by what a typical,

reasonable person would have understood from the exchange between the
consenting person and the officer.

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51

(1991). See also State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct.
App. 2004). Because a typical, reasonable person would have understood that
consent to search one room in the house necessarily entailed entry into the
house, the police entry into the house upon consent to search one room in it was
pursuant to the consent given. The district court therefore erred by concluding
that the entry was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
In response, Greco argues that consent is not granted "when a person
retreats into their [sic] home to get someth.ing and leaves the door open."
(Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8 (citing State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963
P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998) (suspect's act of stepping away from door did not
give implied consent to enter).) Even granting the truth of this assertion, it is
1

irrelevant.

The entry in this case was justified by express verbal consent to

search a room of the house. Whether Greco's retreat from the door would or
would not have been implied consent is irrelevant. Thus, Greco's assertion the
officer entered "without consent" (Respondent's brief, p. 8) is directly contrary to
the district court's factual findings that Greco had consented to a search.

11.
Alternatively, The Search Warrant Application Established Probable Cause Even
In The Absence Of The Evidence Found In The House
The district court also erred by finding that the search warrant was not
supported by probable cause even after exclusion of the evidence found by
police on the initial entry into the house.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-10.)

Specifically, the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when it required
corroboration of a known citizen informant even though such information is
deemed reliable under the applicable law.

(Appellant's brief, p. 9.)

Greco

concedes on appeal that there was probable cause to believe there was
contraband in at least Greco's son's room, but claims the magistrate "lacked
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for the entire house."
(Respondent's brief, p. 11.)

This argument fails for two reasons.

First, the

evidence did not establish only probable cause in a single room of the house.
Second, probable cause to believe there was contraband in the bedroom of the
house was sufficient to support the search warrant.
The evidence in question included that close family members suspected
drug activity in the house because they had seen traffic to the house consistent
with drug trafficking and Greco's grandmother's medications had gone missing.
2

(Warrant Tr., p. 3, L. 12 - p. 5, L. 2.) Police confirmed that there was traffic
coming and going to the house consistent with drug use or trafficking. (Warrant
Tr., p. 5, Ls. 3-12.)

Greco's son, age eleven and in elementary school,

confirmed the presence of paraphernalia and drug use in the home, as well as
the traffic coming to visit Greco in her room for about five minutes at a time.
(Warrant Tr., p. 5, L. 21 - p. 6, L. 25.) Although the son did not specifically
identify specific contraband in the house other than the "bong in his room"
(Warrant Tr., p. 6, Ls. 23-25), an eyewitness to each specific item of
paraphernalia in the house was not necessary to establish probable cause. See
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (probable cause is "a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit ... , there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place"). Likewise, paraphernalia in one part of the house
creates probable cause to believe contraband and other evidence will be found
in other parts of the house. State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 347, 256 P.3d 750,
755 (2011) (loaded syringe seen in bathroom provided probable cause to search
house for contraband and other evidence).
In this case the evidence was that drug use and sales were being
conducted by Greco. Such evidence creates probable cause that expands to the
whole home.

Although there was certainly probable cause to search for

evidence and contraband associated with the son's marijuana use in his
bedroom, it is certainly more likely that evidence of Greco's drug use and sales
was in her room instead of her son's room.
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The district court erred when it concluded that the evidence did not
support probable cause to issue the search warrant. Greco's alternative ground
for affirming the district court-that probable cause was limited to the son's room
and therefore the magistrate erred by including other areas of the house in the
search warrant-is unsupported in fact or law.

Therefore the district court's

order of suppression must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order of suppression and remand for further proceedings.

DATED this 30th day of October,

KENNETH K. JORG~~S~N
Deputy Attorney Ge~eraL.)
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